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Summary  findings
Investment rates in Uganda are similar to others in Africa  associated with transport, corruption,  and utility services.
- averaging slightly more than 10 percent annually,  Several factors - including crime, erratic infrastructure
with a median value of just under 1 percent. But the  services, and arbitrary tax administration - not only
country's profit rates are considerably lower.  increase firms' operating costs but affect their
These results are consistent with the view that  perceptions of the risks of investing in (partly)
Ugandan firms display more confidence in the economy  irreversible capital.
than their counterparts  in other African countries. Thus,  The empirical analysis suggests that firms - especially
for given profit rates, Ugandan firms invest more. At the  small firms - are liquidity-constrained in the sense that
same time, increased competition (because of economic  they invest only when sufficient internal funds are
liberalization) has exerted pressure on firms to cut costs.  available. But given the firms' profit-capital ratio,  it  is
Many of those costs are not under the firms' control,  hard to argue that the liquidity constraint is binding in
however, so their profits have suffered.  most cases, even though the cost of capital is perceived as
Using firm-level data, Reinikka and Svensson identify  a problem.
and quantify a number of cost factors, including those
This paper - a joint  product of Macroeconomics 2, Africa Region, and  Public Economics and  Macroeconomics and
Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study economic policy, public service
delivery, and growth. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
20433.  Please contact Hedy Sladovich, room  Mv[C2-609,  telephone  202-473-7698,  fax 202-522-1154,  email address
hsladovich@worldbank.org. Policy  Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at  wwv.worldbank.org/research/
workingpapers.  The authors  may be contacted  at rreinikka@worldbank.org  or jsvensson@cbworldbank.org.  November
1999.  (33 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about |
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get the  findings  out quickly,  even if  the presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors,  They do not necessarily  represent  the vietv  of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterConfronting  Competition










1818 Street, N. W., Rm. MC 3-361
Washington, DC 20433
Jsvensson@worldbank.org
The findings reported in this paper are based on data from the 1998 Uganda Enterprise Survey which
was  carried  out by  the  Uganda Manufacturers Association  Consultancy  and  Information  Service
(UMACIS) on  behalf  of the  Ugandan  Private  Sector Foundation  and  the  World Bank,  and  was
managed by  William Kalema and Frances Nzonsi.  The survey design benefited  from the Regional
Program  on Enterprise  Development (RPED) and  contributions from Andrew Stone.  Alex Bilson-
Darku and Mimi Klutstein-Meyer  assisted in data analysis.  Useful comments were received  from
participants  in the  annual  seminar on  the  Ugandan  economy organized by  the  Economic  Policy
Research Centre (Kampala) in May 1999, Catherine Pattillo, and Francis Teal.  Generous financial
support  from the  Governments of Austria and  Sweden is  gratefully  acknowledged.I.  Introduction
Despite major  improvements in  the policy  environment, investmnent  rates  in Uganda  are
relatively  similar to others in Africa-on  average slightly over 10 percent annually, with a
median value just  under 1 percent. However, its profit rates are considerably lower. These
results  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  Ugandan  firms  are more  confident  about  the
economy than their counterparts in many other African countries. Thus, for a given expected
return on capital, Ugandan firms invest more. At the same time increased competition, due to
economic liberalization, has put pressure on firms to cut costs. Since many of these costs are
not under their control, firms have not been able fully to meet the challenge of increased
competition by reducing costs, with adverse consequences for profits as a result. Using finn-
level data this paper identifies and quantifies a number of these cost factors, including those
related to utility services, transport, and corruption. Apart from increasing the operating costs
of  firms,  several  of  these  factors-including  erratic infrastructure  services,  arbitrary  tax
administration,  and crime-also  affect the firms'  perceptions  of the risks  of investing  in
partly irreversible capital.
The firm survey data reveal that during the first part of  1998, when the survey was
carried out, most firms had experienced positive demand and value-added changes and the
private sector in Uganda was fairly confident that good macroeconomic management would
continue in the future.  The empirical analysis suggests that firms, in particular small firms,
are liquidity  constrained  in  that they  can only  invest when  sufficient  internal fimds  are
available. However, given the relatively high profit-capital ratio, it is hard to argue that in
most  cases the liquidity constraint is binding.'  Other factors than finance must  therefore
explain the low levels of investment at the firm level.
Investment or physical capital accumulation has played a central role in the literature
on economic growth and development for a long time.  It is fair to say that few economic
ideas are as intuitive as the notion that increasing investment is a good way to raise output
and income.  Recent empirical research also provides supporting evidence for this view-the
rate of investment is robustly and positively correlated with the rate of economic growth in
cross-country, long-run growth regressions (Figure 1).  2
Early research  on growth and investment took a rather mechanical approach to this
relationship:  growth was constrained by a lack of investment which, in turn, was constrained
by a lack of finance (see Easterly  1997). Consequently, if financing was made available, it
was argued, physical capital investment and ultimately growth would follow.
l Although  profit rates are low  relative  to several  other  African  countries,  they are high compared  to the rest
of the world.
2 Recent  research  based on data for a cross-section  of countries  during 1970-97  show that public  investrnent
has not been correlated with growth in Africa (Devarajan,  Easterly, and Pack 1999). Similarly, private
investment  has not been correlated  with growth,  unless  Botswana  is included  in the sample.  This result is not
surprising,  given the poor policy  and institutional  environment  in most of these countries during  most of the
sample  period.Figure  1: Cross-Country  Relationship  between  Investment  and  Growth,  1970-92
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Note:  The Ugandan  data  for 1992-98 was added  for comparison.
Source:  Penn  World  Tables  5.6.
The underlying assumption for this study is broader. We assume that both investment
and growth, and innovation and technical change are driven by the prevailing policies  and
economic,  social,  and  legal  institutions.  While  some  of  these  polices,  in  particular
macroeconomic policies, can be measured directly, the effect and efficiency of other policy
areas are much more difficult to assess. By studying the determinants of private investment at
the firm level, we can study a larger set of institutional and policy issues that affect firms.
The basic idea in the initial wave of the so-called endogenous growth theory is that
growth differences could be  sustained indefinitely because the return to  capital would  not
diminish as economies develop (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Rebelo 1991). Unlike the growth
theory of  the  1960s, recent  research  reflects closer  attention to  the relationship between
theory and data.  In fact, a large empirical literature has developed in the 1990s in which
virtually every possible variable has been invoked and used to  explain this  divergence in
growth over time within the cross-country framework (Barro 1991; and see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995 for a review).  Most of this work explains cross-country differences in growth,
but a few studies have also attempted to explain the poor performance of Africa (Easterly and
Levine 1997; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1996; and see Collier and Gunning 1999 for a review).
While the explanatory power of many of the proposed variables has been shown to depend
on specification, sample or measurement, a few variables appear to be  robustly correlated
with growth (see Levine and Renelt  1992, for a critical review).  These variables  include
investment rate (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil  1992; DeLong and  Summers  1991), level  of
initial income, human capital stock, openness to trade, financial depth, and fiscal stance.  The
African growth "tragedy" has been explained by additional factors, including high volatility
(high  incidence  of  shocks  originating  from  external  terms  of  trade,  climate  or  policy),
deficient public infrastructure, and ethnic fragmentation.
2This paper has two objectives. First, using new microeconomic data from Uganda, we
examine  the  extent  to  which  the  profound  macroeconomic  and  structural  reforms
implemented in the late 1980s and in the 1990s are translating into higher private investment.
We believe that a strong private investment response following the reforms  is essential for
sustaining the rapid growth that Uganda has experienced over the past decade.  Second, while
households are, at present, important economic agents in agriculture and a number of other
sectors, growth of firms is important as households cannot achieve significant economies of
scale necessary for sustaining high growth.  Using quantitative and qualitative survey data,
the paper analyzes factors that constrain investment and the growth of Ugandan firms.
II. Macroeconomic  Evidence  on Investment
Uganda has been growing rapidly during the past decade, with an average growth rate
of 7 percent over the past 12 years and close to 8 percent in the last 5 years, with particularly
strong growth in the industrial sector. Thanks to prudent fiscal policy, inflation has been in
single digits since 1993/94. The exchange rate has been market-determined since 1993, with
the  central  bank  smoothing  fluctuations;  current  and  capital  account  are  completely
liberalized.  As  shown in  Table  1, price  and real exchange volatility  has been  relatively
limited since  1993/94.  Despite financial liberalization,  lending rates and particularly  the
spread between the lending and saving rates remain high, reflecting inefficiencies and bad
loan portfolios in the banking sector. Trade liberalization has been extensive, including  a
complete removal of quantitative restrictions and reduction of import duties gradually over
time (World Bank 1996).  As a result, Uganda's tariffs are now among the lowest in Africa,
the highest official rate being 15 percent on consumer goods. Raw materials carry a rate of 7
percent and capital goods are zero-rated. Regional tariffs are even lower.  Hence, compared
to many  other  African countries,  Uganda's  macroeconomic policy  environment  is  good.
According to  cross-country  evidence, this  should attract increased private  investment  and
economic growth. 3
One  obvious  explanation  for  the  high  growth  rates  in  Uganda  is  the  preceding
economic contraction, which resulted from a long period of mismanagement of the economy
during 1972-85 when the capital stock shrunk.  Hence, much of the subsequent growth has
resulted from increased use of capacity, improved allocation of existing resources, and return
of  both  human  and  financial  flight  capital.  As  such opportunities  become  increasingly
scarce, significant private investment is required to stimulate the economy.
3 See Bigsten  et al. (1999) for growth  rates and macroeconomic  indicators  in Cameroon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  and
Zimbabwe.
3Table 1: Selected  Macroeconomic  Indicators  for Uganda
GDP  Real effective  Real lending
Fiscal years  growth  Inflation  exchange rate  rate
1987-90  6.3  140.1  163.8  -40.5
1991-93  5.8  32.3  71.5  0.6
1994-95  8.9  6.3  88.9  10.2
1996-98  6.8  7.0  88.4  13.4
Note: Fiscal year July 1 - June 30.
Source: World Bank and International Financial Statistics (IMF).
What is the macroeconomic evidence on investment to date?  According to the national
accounts, private  investment increased, on average, by  13 percent  per  annum in  the past
decade. The coffee boom in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 created a peak during which private
investment  (in constant prices)  grew by  alnost  40  percent, while  its  share  of the  gross
domestic product (GDP) increased from 9.9 to 12.4 percent (Table 2).  The largest increase
was in machinery and equipment investment.  Since then, growth in private investment has
slowed, but the level of investment achieved during the coffee boom has been maintained
and even surpassed in 1997/98.  Following the initial rehabilitation phase of the late 1980s,
the share of public investment in GDP has fallen to about 6-7  percent, while the share of
total fixed investment has ranged between 15 and 20 percent of GDP.  For comparison, until
recently the share of investment was about 30 percent of GDP in the fast growing East Asian
economies.  Such high levels were maintained for more than two decades.
Table  2: Investment  as a Share  of GDP at Market  Prices,
Fiscal  Year 1986/87-1997/98
86/87  87/88  88/89  89/90  90/91  91/92  92/93  93/94  94/95  96/96  96/97  97/98
Current Prices
Fixed investment  9.7  10.8  11.1  12.7  15.2  15.9  15.2  14.6  15.4  16.6  15.5  15.5
Public  4.3  5.6  5.4  6.2  7.4  7.4  6.7  5.4  5.4  6.3  5.6  5.6
Private  5.4  5.2  5.7  6.5  7.8  8.5  8.5  9.1  10.0  10.3  9.9  9.9
Machinery & vehicles  3.8  4.5  4.4  5.2  6.1  6.0  5.3  4.7  5.6  5.4  3.7  3.4
Construction  5.9  6.3  6.7  7.5  9.0  9.9  9.9  9.9  9.8  11.2  11.8  12.0
Constant Prices
Fixed investment  17.8  20.2  18.1  17.2  16.8  15.5  15.1  15.5  19.5  20.2  18.8  19.3
Public  10.2  12.4  10.4  9.3  8.3  6.9  6.3  5.7  7.1  8.0  6.8  5.9
Private  7.6  7.8  7.6  7.9  8.5  8.6  8.8  9.9  12.4  12.2  12.0  13.5
Machinery & vehicles  8.5  9.6  8.1  7.4  6.8  5.6  5.0  4.9  7.6  7.1  5.1  4.8
Construction  9.3  10.6  10.0  9.9  10.0  9.9  10.1  10.7  11.9  13.1  13.7  14.6
Source:  Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.
The high  GDP growth rates in  the past decade  and the relatively  modest  (although
increasing) share of investment in GDP place Uganda well above the long-term cross-country
regression line depicted in Figure 1.  Given that considerable reallocation and rehabilitation
of the  existing capacity  has  already taken place,  it is unlikely  that  growth rates  can be
sustained in the future without a higher share of investment.  Thus, a challenge for Uganda's
future economic growth is to implement policies that are conducive to technological change
and private investment, while at the same time ensuring that both private and public capital
are efficiently employed.
4III.  Firm-Level  Evidence
Firm  surveys  have  proven  a  useful  tool  to  explore  private-sector  responses  to
macroeconomic reforns  and to increase our understanding of microeconomic constraints to
investment.  Such surveys can also help policymakers prioritize policies and interventions to
improve  the  business  environment.  In  Africa,  the  Regional  Program  on  Enterprise
Development (RPED), initiated by the World Bank, has produced valuable quantitative data
on manufacturing  firms  over time for Burundi,  Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire,  Ghana, Kenya,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Biggs and Srivastava 1996).
Enterprise Survey in Uganda
A private-sector enterprise survey for Uganda was carried out between February  and
July  1998 jointly  by  the World Bank  and the Ugandan  Private  Sector Foundation.  The
survey design benefits from the RPED model, particularly the Ghana and Zimbabwe surveys,
but  it  is  more  limited  in  scope,  focusing  mostly  on  physical  investment,  exports,
infrastructure services, taxation, policy credibility, regulation, and corruption. However, the
survey in Uganda covered a wider range of industrial sectors than the RPED. Apart from
manufacturing, which was divided into agro-processing and other manufacturing, the survey
included  firms  representing  tourism,  commercial agriculture,  and  construction,  as  these
sectors are expected to have substantial growth potential. Data were collected for  1995-97.
Given that the survey required confidential infornation-such  as the firm's  costs, sales, and
tax payments-interviews  were  carried  out by  the  Uganda  Manufactures  Association  to
obtain  maximum  cooperation of  the  firms.  Enumerator training  was  emphasized,  and  a
questionnaire was carefully piloted beforehand.  In addition to quantitative data, the survey
also collected information on firms' perceptions on various constraints to investment.  The
latter component was modeled on a similar survey carried out in  1994 by the World Bank,
allowing  an  examination  of  dynamics  of  the  business  environment  and  constraints,  as
perceived by the private sector.
The  latest  complete  industrial  census in  Uganda  dates  back to  1989. An  updated
industrial census was carried out  in  1996 but it included only  eight  (out of 45) districts.
Despite its limited geographical coverage, the districts included in the 1996 update actually
represent  80 percent  of  value  added in  the  private  industrial  sector  and  70 percent  of
employment, based on the 1989 census.  It was thus decided to base the sampling frame of
the survey on the 1996 update instead of the complete but much older census, particularly as
the number of new enterprises has increased dramatically in the past decade.  Based on the
1996 update, 37 percent of the firms active today were established since 1990. Although the
district of Mbarara was not included in the census update, it was added to the survey because
of its importance as a regional business center today.
The  firm  survey  was  confined  to  five  sectors-commercial  agriculture  (includes
fishing), agro-processing, other manufacturing, construction, and tourism.  Table 3 shows the
distribution of establishments and employment by firm size and sector in the 1996 updated
industrial census.  Firm  size is defined by employment.  Neither  the update nor the  1989
census includes firms with less than five employees, so the initial size breakdown was small
(5-20  employees), medium (21-100  employees), large (101-500  employees) and very large
(over 500 employees).  Subsequently, large and very large firms were treated as one group.
The five sectors selected for the survey comprise 52 percent of all enterprises included in the
census update and almost 80 percent of employment.
5Table  3:  Private  Sector  Enterprises  Based  on the 1996 Updated  Industrial  Census
Enterprises  Employment
Share  Share
Number  (percent)  Number  (percent)
By firm  size
Small (5-20)  1,957  79.8  16,893  24.9
Medium (21-100)  405  16.5  16,980  25.0
Large (> 100)  89  3.6  34,048  50.1
Total  2,451  100.0  67,921  100.0
By sector
Five chosen sectors  1,282  52.3  52,535  77.3
Mining  17  0.7  1,024  1.5
Wholesale and Retail  753  30.7  9,565  14.1
Transport  94  3.8  1,796  2.6
Financial Intermediation  23  0.9  344  0.5
Business activities  98  4.0  1,861  2.7
Other  184  7.5  796  1.2
Total  2,451  100.0  67,921  100.0
Source:  Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.
Table  Al  in  the  Annex  shows  the distribution  of  establishments  and  employment
within  the  five  selected  industrial  sectors  by  firm  size  and  sector.  The  within-sector
distribution of employment shows large variations across sectors. Most of the employment
within commercial agriculture and  construction is concentrated in two to three very  large
firms, while most of the employment in tourism is in the small firms.  Employment in agro-
processing and other manufacturing is relatively evenly distributed across firm size.
The following criteria were taken into account when we constructed a stratified random
sample for the survey:
o  The sample should be reasonably representative of the population of establishments in the
five specified industrial categories.
- The establishments surveyed should account for a substantial share of national output in
each of the industrial categories.
*  The sample should be sufficiently diverse in terms of firm size.
. There  should  be  enough  representation  outside Kampala  to  draw  conclusions  about
industrial activity in Uganda as a whole.
The final sample consisted of 243 surveyed firms and was similar in size and regional
distribution to the stratified sample constructed initially (see Reinikka and Svensson 1998).
The characteristics of the sampled firms are set out in Table A2 in the annex by firm size,
sector, location, and ownership.  Over 80 percent of large firms, about 30 percent of medium-
sized firms and  about  10 percent  of  small firms in  the five sectors were  surveyed.  Five
different geographical areas were covered:  Kampala, Jinja-Iganga, Mbale-Tororo, Mukono,
and Mbarara.  The first four make up 98 percent of total  employment in the five selected
sectors  reported  in  the  1996 census  update.  In  terms of  ownership-which  was  not  a
criterion  for  sample  selection-70  percent  of  firms  were  Ugandan-owned,  16  percent
foreign-owned and 14 percent jointly owned. Table A3 in the Annex presents the distribution
of establishments and employment in the final sample by sector and size of the firm.
6The survey  typically  consisted of  at  least two  visits  to  each  firm by  one  or two
enumerators.  While the manager's perceptions were relatively easy to obtain during a single
interview, quantitative data on costs, sales and taxation, which were collected for three years,
usually required another visit to consult the accountant. During the course of the survey it
was found that a number of firms had changed business activity since 1996, for example, by
shifting to trading instead of manufacturing.  Similarly, a number of firms were difficult to
locate; either they had gone out of business since 1996 or moved to another address, or the
1996 industrial census update may have contained firms from the 1989 census which had
gone out of business before 1996. A few firms refused to participate in the survey.  For all
these reasons, 39 percent of the firms in the final sample were randomly chosen alternates to
the initially drawn random sample.
Investment Data
Before analyzing the regression results, it is useful to examine the Ugandan investment
data and compare them to similar data for four other African countries:  Cameroon, Ghana,
Kenya  and Zimbabwe. We have data on employment, capital stock, investment, sales, and
value added for 192 Ugandan firms for a three-year period (1995-97).  Since we use changes
in  some  of the variables,  we lose  one year  of observations in  levels (1995).  Thus,  data
permitting,  each firm has two observations, and the total number  of observations is 367.
Initial inspection of the data led us to discard 14 of these observations as outliers, leaving a
sample size of 353.4
As  shown  in  Table  4,  about  half  of  the  Ugandan  firms  made  an  investment  in
machinery and equipment in both  1996 and  1997.  This is similar to the African country
average listed in the table.  For individual countries where comparable information exists, the
percentage  of Ugandan  firms  that  invested is  somewhat higher than  that  in  Cameroon,
Ghana, and Kenya, but lower than in Zimbabwe (Bigsten et al. 1999). While large firms are
more likely to invest (77 percent of large and 45 percent of small firms in  Uganda), they
invest less relative to their capital stock than smaller firms.  For the Ugandan  firms  that
invested, the  value  of investment relative  to  the capital  stock  (investment rate)  was,  on
average, 11 percent for large firms and 30 percent for small firms.  For all Ugandan firms, the
investment rate was 13 percent in 1996 and 11 percent for 1997. Again, this pattern is quite
similar to the African comparator country average.  With respect to individual comparator
countries, the investment rate  for the firms that invested in Uganda  is lower than that in
Cameroon and Ghana, about the same as in Kenya, and higher than in Zimbabwe.
Averages, however, can be misleading when the underlying distribution is skewed. At
the median firm, the Ugandan investment rate is very low:  it is less than  1 percent for all
firms and 4.7 percent for those firms that invest. The picture is similar in the four comparator
countries; that is, median investment rates for all firms range from zero in Cameroon and
Kenya, less than 1 percent in Ghana, to 3 percent in Zimbabwe.
4 We dropped  observations  with reported  value  added-to-capital  above 1,000  percent or below -100 percent.
A closer inspection  of the data revealed  that rmisreported  or erroneous  recording of capital stock data was the
source  of these  extreme  values.
7Table  4:  Investment  in Machinery  and Equipment  by African  Firms  (Means)
Investment-  Investment-
Proportion  of  capital  stock  capital  stock
firms  investing  for  aDl  firms  if firms  invest
Cameroon
1993-94  0.125  0.059  0.479
1994-95  0.347  0.132  0.382
Ghana
1992  0.363  0.090  0.428
1993  0.536  0.136  0.254
Kenya
1993  0.357  0.072  0.202
1994  0.459  0.127  0.277
Zimbabwe
1993  0.621  0.069  0.111
1994  0.738  0.142  0.193
Comparator  average
All  firms  0.535  0.128  0.239
Large  firms  0.738  0.113  0.152
Small  firms  0.458  0.134  0.291
Uganda
1996  0.506  0.134  0.263
1997  0.529  0.111  0.208
Large  firms  0.765  0.083  0.109
Small  firms  0.445  0.133  0.300
Note: Large  firms  have  more  than 100  employees,  while  small  firms  have 100  or less employees.
Source: Bigsten  et al. (1999)  and  the Ugandan  survey  data.
By  and  large,  the  survey  data  seem to  be  consistent  with  the  trend  depicted  by
Uganda's  macroeconomic data.  As  shown in  Table  2, private  investment  was relatively
stable  during  the  survey  period  of  1995-97,  while  the  overall  share  of  investment  in
machinery and equipment in GDP fell somewhat after the 1994-95 coffee boom.
As shown in Table 5, there are obvious differences between firms that invest and those
that do  not  invest.  Investing firms,  orn  average,  have higher profits,  tend to  experience
positive  changes  in  demand  and  value  added,  are  larger  in  tenns  of  value  added  and
employment, and are somewhat more recently established.  Uganda and Ghana are the only
countries that experience a positive change in value added (and gross sales for Uganda) at the
median, reflecting a growing economy and relatively good economic policies.  For Ugandan
firms  that  invest  the  sales-to-capital stock ratio  increased  by  42 percent,  on  average  (9
percent at the median), while for firms that did not invest, the change in sales was negative
(zero at the median).
Another notable characteristic of African firms is that the mean and median profit rates
are very high, that is, profit as a share of the installed capital stock is high. These are gross
profits  that  are  calculated  as the  firm's  value  added less  wages  and  interest  payments.
Compared to the rest of the world, the high profit-to-capital ratios are likely to be driven by
the very low level of installed machinery and equipment.
8Table 5: Summary  Statistics  for Uganda,  Pooled  Data  for 1996-97
Firms that invest  Firms that do not invest  All firms
Variable  mean  mean  mean
[median]  [median]  [median]
Profit rate  0.914  0.565  0.747
[0.306]  [0.177]  [0.256)
Change in sales-to-capital stock  0.418  -0.023  0.207
(0.090]  [0.0011  [0.0281
Change in value added-to-capital  0.214  0.012  0.117
stock  [0.027]  [-0.001]  [0.007]
Value added-to-capital stock  1.39  0.890  1.149
[0.5011  [0.330]  [0.414]
Size (employment)  150  51  103
[501  [19]  [28]
Age  12  14  13
[9]  [11  [0]
Investment rate  0.234  0.122
[0.0471  [0.0021
Note: There were 184 observations  with positive  investment  and 169 with zero investment.  Mean  values with median
values are in square brackets. Variables  expressed  as ratio  of lagged  capital stock, except  for size and age.
For the four comparator countries, Bigsten et al. (1999) report an average profit rate of
198 percent and a median of 40 percent for all firms.  While the Ugandan investment rates do
not differ much from the African average, its average profit rates are clearly lower.  They are
also lower than in any individual comparator country.  In fact, profit rates in Uganda, both at
the median and the mean, are only about one-half of those reported for the pooled African
sample:  for those  Ugandan  firms that invested, the mean profit rate was 91 percent  (31
percent  at the median),  while  for all  firms the mean  was 75  percent  (26 percent  at the
median).  We will return to these stylized facts in the next section.
Flexible Accelerator Model
To what extent is investment across Ugandan firms driven by changes in demand? Are
firms in  general constrained by liquidity? Does age and size matter? Are there any  clear
geographical or sectoral differences in investment behavior?
To answer these questions we estimate a simple flexible accelerator model.  In this
model, fluctuations in demand are assumed to motivate investment.  Given the weaknesses of
the financial sector in African economies, we adopt a model where firms do not have access
to credit and simply allocate current profits to investment (for details see Tybout 1983). A
similar approach has been applied to four other African countries, namely Cameroon, Ghana,
Kenya,  and  Zimbabwe  (Bigsten et  al. 1999).  By  replicating  their  specification,  we can
explore whether Uganda, with its better macroeconomic record, differs in any way from the
other countries in terms of firms'  investment response. As in  the case of the comparator
countries, we use data on investment in machinery and equipment.
The flexible accelerator model of investment for a profit maximizing firm i, which is
liquidity constrained, can be written as follows: 5
See annex  A4.
9li (t) = (x,i  + aQ AQi  (t) +  c,7ri  (t) + otIli  (t-1) + a, Xi + dt + si  (1)
where Ii (t) is the level of investment for firm i at time t, aci is the constant for firm i, AQi
denotes the change in sales, 7ti is the level of profits, Xi denotes firm-specific characteristics
(age, size), dt is a time dummy, and £j  is the error term.  To avoid the heteroskedasticity
problem with respect to size in the estimation, the variables are expressed in rates, that is,
scaled by the inverse of capital stock at the end of the previous period, K(t-1).
The empirical model set out in equation (1) treats investment as a continuous variable.
However,  capital  investment  is  typically  lumpy, which  constrains the  firm's  investment
behavior.  In  a  given year the  firm may not  be  able to  invest the  desired  amount,  and
therefore  chooses  not  to  invest  at  all.  In  other  words,  the  observable  data  on  firms'
investment rates are incidentally truncated, and thus equation (1) is estimated in two stages.6
The two-stage procedure involves, first, the estimation of a probit model of the decision to
invest and, second, an estimation of the investment rate equation for the finns that invested,
accounting for the selection of firns  with only positive investment
Regression Results
In this  section, we explore how well the flexible accelerator model,  as expressed in
equation  (1),  can  explain  the  decision  to  invest by  Ugandan  firms  and  the  amount  of
investment. Table 6 reports the basic results, including the two-stage estimation and the tobit
regression.  Apart  from  the variables defined  above, each regression  includes  a vector  of
industrial category and  location-specific dummies. Colunm 1 shows the result of the first-
stage probit model concerning the decision to invest. At the 90 percent confidence level, we
find  that  both  the  accelerator  (change  in  sales)  and  the  liquidity  constraint  (profit)  are
important  in  the decision  to  invest. Thus,  according to  the prediction  of  the  accelerator
model, Ugandan firms invest to meet increases in demand, given that they have sufficient
funds to do so. If they do not have adequate profits, they cannot invest, even if demand for
their product is increasing. 7
6 Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure. If the factors which determine  the decision to invest and the
amount  of investment  are the same, the correct  specification  is the tobit  model.
7 The results are very similar  when using the lagged profit-to-capital  ratio instead of the profit-to-lagged-
capital  ratio.
10Table  6: Investment  Regressions  for All Ugandan  Firms
(1)  (2)  (3)
Probit  regression  OLS  regression  Tobit  regression
Constant  -1.15  0.992  -0.430
(0.470)  (0.525)  (0.232)
Change  in sales-to-capital  stock  0.164  -0.055  0.032
(0.073)  (0.042)  (0.028)
Profit  rate  0.090  0.076"  0.100
(0.054)  (0.035)  (0.024)
Age (log)  -0.250  -0.028  -0.147
(0.092)  (0.054)  (0.045)
Size  (log)  0.372  -0.120  0.087
(0.064)  (0.075)  (0.030)
Time  dummy  0.060  -0.082  -0.005
(0.144)  (0.084)  (0.072)
District  dummies  significant  No  No  No
Industrial  category  dummies  significant  Yes  No  Yes
Agro-processing  0.844  0.258
(0.288)  (0.137)




Observations  353  184  353
Note: (i)  Dependent  varable in equation  (1)  takes  the value  1 if the firm invested  and  0 otherwise;  (ii) standard
errors  (in parenthesis)  are  adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  (White  1980);  (iii) regressions  (2)-(3) are adjusted  for
selectivity,  the inverse  Mills ratio  is  not reported.  (iv)  *** [** (*)  denotes  significance  at  the 1 [5] (10) percent  level.
Age and size also enter significantly into the decision to invest. Bigsten et al. (1999)
argue that size may proxy the likelihood that indivisibilities in investment constrain capital
accumulation (the constraint is less likely to bind for large firms), and that older firms are
likely to have better access to bank finance.  The Ugandan data supports the first of these
assumptions-size  is  positively  correlated with  the probability  to  invest, but  rejects  the
second-age  enters significantly, but with a negative sign.  A possible explanation for the
latter result is that older firms in the sample were first established in an environment with a
very different incentive system.  While many establishments in the 1996 census update began
operating during the 1990s (37 percent), many of the older firms were endowed with a capital
stock  that, because  of drastic changes in the policy environment, is no longer viable (for
example, equipment to produce an import-substituting good).  These firms are therefore less
willing to invest. Two industrial category dummies are also significant. Holding changes in
demand and profit constant, firms in agro-processing and tourism are more likely to invest.
Column 2 in Table 6 reports the second-stage regression, which examines the amount
of investment for those firms that invested in machinery and equipment. 8 Now  only profit
enters significantly. Thus, while demand changes play a role in determining whether or not to
invest, profit is the only binding constraint for the level of investment. The results suggest
s We also applied  the flexible accelerator model  to investrnent data on buildings  and  land. In the probit
model, we  find that only size and  some district and industrial category  dummies are  significant (at the  10
percent  level) for  the  decision  to  invest,  while  none  of  the  variables  are  significant  in  the  second-stage
regression.
11that most (but not all) firms can generate funds for some investment if demand is increasing,
but they  cannot realize  their desired investment level if  current profits  are not  sufficient.
Interestingly, neither  age nor size or any of the dummies enter significantly. Thus, while
indivisibilities and sector-specific factors are important for the decision to invest, they do not
influence the actual investment level.  This interpretation is supported by the tobit regression
reported in column 3.  The profit rate is highly significant but the accelerator is insignificant
at the conventionally accepted significance levels.
We also experimented with a dynamic specification of the model (that is, including a
lagged dependent variable), and all qualitative results continue to hold. The main difference
is that the size of the coefficient on the profit term is reduced, from 0.100 to 0.059 in the tobit
model.  Lagged investment is insignificant in all specifications, that is, the decision to invest,
the investment level regression, and the tobit model.  Given the lack of significance, and
since we lose around a dozen observations by including the lagged dependent variable, we
believe that the restricted model (reported in Table 6) is preferable.
Another  objection  to  the  results  reported  above  is  that  it  may  be  driven  by
unobservable firmn-specific  factors.  To test this we ran a second-stage regression with fixed
effects (using  deviations  from means).  The results imply  a lower  but  highly  significant
coefficient on the profit term (0.034 with a t-value 4.80).  However, a test of the hypothesis
that the fixed effects were all equal across firms indicated that the fixed effect specification
was not  efficient.  In  other words, the  fixed effects  are picking  up important  cross-firm
differences in profits and demand, reducing the explanatory power of these variables in the
regression.
In Table 7 the sample is partitioned into small firms (100 employees or less) and large
firns  (more than 100 employees). The results reveal some interesting trends. First, for the
decision to  invest (columns 1 and 3): for small firms only the profit term is significantly
positive, while for large firms the important explanatory variable is changes in demand. The
second-stage regressions  (columns 2 and 4) show a similar pattern  for small firms, while
neither profit nor the accelerator is significant for large firms. 9 As before, only the age of the
firm appears significantly and negatively, for the large firms. The tobit regressions for small
and large firms are reported in columns 5 and 6.10
9  While in both 1994 and 1998,  interest  rates were ranked as one of the leading constraints  by firms of all
sizes, firms' perceptions  varied considerably  regarding  access  to finance. As in the quantitative  analysis, the
perceptions  of larger enterprises  seem to be different  from the smaller  ones. For large enterprises  that had not
borrowed money recently, the leading reason after "high interest rates" was "no need to borrow."  Nor did
collateral  requirements  prevent large firms from borrowing;  the smaller the firm, the more collateral was a
problem.  Liquidity  constraints  may  be binding  for start-ups,  however.
10 The lack of clear results for large firms in the second-stage  regression  may be driven  by the small sample
size. By estimating  a tobit regression,  we save  on the degrees  of freedom.
12Table 7:  Investment  Regressions  for Small and Large  Firms
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
OLS  Probit  OLS  Tobit  Tobit
Probit  [small  [large  [large  [small  [large
[small  firis]  firms]  firms]  firms]  finrs]  firms]
Constant  1.14  0.005  4.95  0.468  -0.727  0.169
(0.582)  (0.216)  (2.33)  (0.227)  (0.365)  (0.219)
Change  in sales-to-capital  0.102  -0.040  0.94  0.006  0.010  0.048
stock  (0.076)  (0.038)  (0.342)  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.028)
Profitrate  0.143  0.109  -0.12  0.036  0.145  0.011
(0.065)  (0.051)  (0.139)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.017)
Age (log)  -0.306  -0.062  -0.065  -0.193  -0.064
(0.104)  (0.333)  (0.031)  (0.064)  (0.028)
Size  (log)  0.395  -0.828  0.154  0.014
(0.105)  (0.399)  (0.064)  (0.036)
Time  dummy  0.019  -0.098  0.524  0.026  -0.042  0.066
(0.160)  (0.111)  (0.411)  (0.049)  (0.099)  (0.046)







Industrial  category  dummies  Yes  No  Yes(v)  No  No  No
significant
Agro-processing  0.708  2.06
(0.350)  (0.814)
Predictability  0.67  0.80
R2  0.16  0.27
Observations  278  126  75  58  278  75
Note: (i)  Dependent  variable  in equation  (1)  takes  the  value  I if the  firm  invested  and  0 otherwise;  (ii)  standard  errors
(in parenthesis)  are  adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  (White  1980);  (iii)  (2), (4H6) are  adjusted  for selectivity,  the inverse
Mills  ratio  is not  reported.  (iv) ***  r*] (*)  denotes  significance  at  the 1  [5]  (10)  percent  level;  (v)  the  tourism  dummy  had
to be dropped  from  regression  3 since  all large  firms  in this  sector  invested.
The results reported above suggest that finns,  in particular small firms, are liquidity
constrained in the sense that they cannot invest (or invest only small amounts) when demand
is increasing if they do not have sufficient funds available. However, given the reported high
profit-to-capital ratio in Uganda (and in the four comparator countries), it is hard  to argue
that the liquidity constraint is binding in most cases.
It is interesting to compare the Ugandan results to the existing evidence on investment
in other African countries."' First, regarding the decision to invest and using the same model
specification, the Ugandan  coefficient for profit is found to be  somewhat larger. Also  in
levels the estimated coefficient for profit in Uganda is larger (0.076 versus 0.03 elsewhere).
This holds for all firms and when we divide the firms into two  groups according to  size.
Compared to the rest of the world, the estimated coefficient on profit (and accelerator) is
smaller  in  Uganda,  even though  it  is  larger than in  the  African comparator  countries.'2
Bigsten  et  al. (1999)  find no robust  correlation between  the  accelerator and  investment,
As Bigsten et al. (1999) does not report marginal effects, we compare the results at each stage.
12  For example, Bond et al. (1997); Athey and Laumas (1994); Tybout (1983); and Bigsten et al.  (1999).
13although we find some evidence that demand plays a role in investment for large firms.  Age
and size of the firm behave similarly in Uganda as elsewhere.
In the next section we explore constraints to investment beyond demand and finance.
The analysis is based on rich quantitative and qualitative data on the business environment
obtained from the Ugandan  firms, and begins with the observation that firms'  profit rates
appear to be lower in Uganda than elsewhere in Africa, while investment rates are at about
the same (generally low) level.
IV.  Constraints  to Investment
Some Stylized Facts
So far we have examined determinants of private investment by different types of firms
in the single country context.  In general, the Ugandan results are strikingly similar to those
obtained  from several other African countries.  In this section we take the viewpoint of a
typical or average Ugandan firm and examine differences across countries.  In particular, we
attempt to explain the observation that firms'  profit rates are lower in Uganda, while their
investment rates are similar.
Table 8 reports a series of regression of profit rates on size and foreign ownership,
using  data  from both  the  Ugandan  firm survey  and the  four other  surveys described  in
Bigsten et al. (1999). Column 1 illustrates the result when pooling all variables (altogether
1287  observations).  As  evident,  size  (logarithm  of  total  employment)  is  significantly
negatively  correlated  with  the  profit  rate  (profit-to-capital ratio).  Foreign  ownership  is
positively  related  with  profit;  however,  the  dummy  variable  enters  only  marginally
significant (at the 10 percent level).  In column 2 we add a dummy for Ugandan firms. The
dummy enters with a large (in absolute terms) negative coefficient and is highly significant.
Thus, controlling for size and ownership, Ugandan firms on average make significantly lower
profits than firms in the four comparator countries.
Interestingly,  there  are  significant  differences  across  the  four  comparators.  When
adding (individually) country controls for the four comparators to column 1, we find that the
country dummies for  Cameroon, Kenya  and Zimbabwe  are insignificantly  different  from
zero, while the Ghana dummy is significantly positive.
As reported in column 3, we obtain a similar result if we include all country controls
(we  need  to  drop  one  to  estimate  the regression).  The  Uganda  dummy  is  significantly
negative, while the  Cameroon and Zimbabwe  (and Kenya  if we  replace Zimbabwe  with
Kenya) controls are insignificant and Ghana is significantly positive.
14Table 8: Profit  Rate Regressions,  Pooled  Data  for Cameroon,
Ghana,  Kenya,  Uganda,  and  Zimbabwe
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Profit  rate  Profit  rate  Profit  rate  Profit  rate  Profit  rate
Constant  3.46  3.99  3.41  2.02  1.81
(0,444)  (0.510)  (0.631)  (0.172)  (0.221)
Foreign  0.933  0.801  0.856  -0.014  -0.007
(0.493)  (0.480)  (0.481)  (0.105)  (0.105)
Size  (log)  -0.631  -0.623  -0.523  -0.267  -0.238
(0.128)  (0.109)  (0.104)  (0.035)  (0.037)
Uganda  -1.23  -1.03  -0.559  -0.447
(0.194)  (0.373)  (0.090)  (0.152)
Cameroon  -0.557  -0.005
(0.476)  (0.211)
Zimbabwe  -0.345  -0.018
(0.363)  (0.151)
Ghana  1.51  0.452
(0.691)  (0.212)
R2  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.10
Observations  1,287  1,287  1,287  1,058  1,058
Note: (i) Dependent  variable  is profit  rate  (profit  to  capital  ratio),  foreign  is  a binary  variable  taking  the  value  1  if the  firm
is  foreign  owned,  0 otherwise;  (ii) standard  errors  (in  parenthesis)  are  adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  (White  1980);  (iii)
[**) (*) denotes  significance  at the 1  [5] (10)  percent  level;  (iv)  regressions  (4)-(5)  exclude  outliers.
There are at least two possible objections to the pooled results in columns 1-3. First,
while  the  Uganda  sample  includes both  manufacturing  firms  and  firms  in  commercial
agnculture, tourism and construction, the sample of firms of the comparator countries only
include manufacturing firms (including agro-processing firms). To control for this possibility
we dropped all Ugandan firms in commercial agriculture, tourism, and construction. Second,
in the Uganda sample a few firms with extreme value added were excluded (as reported in
footnote 4), while the sample of firms of the comparator countries include a few firms with
extreme profit rates (and value added) of  more than  1,000 (up to almost  8,000 percent).
While these observations may not necessarily be misreported, it would be of concern if the
results were driven by them.  To examine this possibility, we dropped all observations with
profit  rates larger than  1,000 percent  and lower  than -100  percent.  The new  results  are
depicted in columnns  4-5.
As evident, the qualitative results are very similar to those reported above. The Uganda
dummy is negative and highly significant, but with a smaller coefficient (in absolute terms).
The  result in  column 4  implies  that on  average, controlling for  size and  ownership, the
Ugandan firm's  profit rate is 56 percentage points lower. Again, there are some differences
across the  four  comparators. Repeating the procedure  described  above, we  find  that  the
country dummies for Cameroon, Kenya  and Zimbabwe are again insignificantly  different
from  zero, while  the  Ghana  dummy  is  significantly positive.  As  shown  in  column  (5),
including all country controls simultaneously yields a similar result. The Uganda dummy is
significantly negative, while the Cameroon and Kenya (and Zimbabwe if we replace Kenya
with Zimbabwe) controls are insignificant and Ghana is significantly positive. Finally, note
that the coefficient on size is now only one-third of that reported in column 1, suggesting that
a few extreme observations significantly affect the size of the coefficient.13
13 In fact, when dropping  all firms  with profit rates larger  than 300 percent,  we find no significant  statistical
relationship  between  size and profit. The relationship  between  profit rates and size for Ugandan  manufacturing
15Conceptual Framework
How  can Ugandan investment rates be similar when its profit rates are lower? In this
section we construct a simple model suggesting one possible answer.
Consider a two-period model of a representative firm.  A risk-neutral manager decides
on the firm's  level of investment in period one to maximize the present value of its cash flow
cl+Pc2, where P=1/(l+O) is the discount factor.  We can think of 0 as capturing expectations
about the future.  We assume first that the firm can borrow in period one.  The interest on the
borrowed amount (b) is r.  To avoid extreme solutions, we assume that r>  0, implying that
the firm will only borrow to finance investrnent.  The budget constraint in period one is then:
cl+ i <  7m + b  (2)
where n,  is the initial profit available to the firm, and i is the level of investment.  The return
to  investment (or  gross  profit)  is  captured by  the  concave  and  strictly positive  revenue
function iT 2(i:x), where x is a vector of variables which affect the profit but which the firm
cannot control (degree of competition, infrastructure, etc.).  The budget constraint in period
two can be expressed:
C2 =  7r2(i:x) - (1+r)b.  (3)
The model is easily solved by maximizing the firm's  cash flow subject to the budget
constraints.  Provided that the firm has sufficient internal funds, it will not borrow.  Then the
first-order condition which defines the optimal level of investment i* can be written as14
TC'2(i*)  - (1+0)  = O  (4)
The first term in equation (4) is the marginal return curve (MR).  The second term is
the discounted opportunity cost.  The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure  2.  This  simple
model has a number of interesting implications.  First, a policy change that, ceteris paribus,
reduces  profits  (for  example,  increased  competition  from  aboard  resulting  from  trade
liberalization) shifts the marginal return curve (MR) inwards, leading to  a lower  level  of
investment for a given r and 0 for the existing firms.15 A lower discount rate 0 (for example,
better economic polices are expected in the future) would shift the horizontal curve down,
leading to a higher investment level as future income becomes more valuable.
firms is also significantly negative (coefficient = 0. 17).
14 If the firm does not have sufficient internal funds, that is,  ,Bm' 2(-tI)-l>O, it will borrow.  The first order
condition then becomes 71'2(7EI+b)-(+r)=O.
15 In this context, we disregard the fact that increased competition may have other effects,  such as raising
productivity, which would shift the MR-curve outwards.





Note: MR denotes  the marginal  retum;  0 the discount  rate;  and i the level of investment.
Comparing Uganda  with  other African countries, the model  helps  us  explain  why
investment rates can be  similar, while profit rates are lower.  Increased  competition has
reduced profits,  and would, everything else being equal, have reduced investment rates as
well.  However, less uncertainty about future policies, resulting in a lower 0, counterbalances
the  negative  effect  of  tougher  competition  on  the  level  of  capital  accumulation.  In
equilibrium (Figure 3a,b,c), investment is the same, while profits and profit rates are lower.
While it would be interesting to test the above simple model statistically using the Ugandan
survey data, endogeneity problems and lack of suitable instruments effectively prevent this.
Instead we use the above conceptual framework to organize our discussion of the factors that
are likely to  shift the marginal return (MR) curve and the discount rate (0) of an average
Ugandan firm.  We pose two hypothetical  questions.  First, why is the Ugandan  marginal
return curve likely to be to the left of that of other African countries?  Second, why is the
discount  rate  of  Ugandan  firms  likely  to  be  smaller  than  elsewhere  in  Africa?  The
diagnostics are based on both quantitative and qualitative survey data from Uganda and focus
on  constraints  to  investment,  competitive  environment,  costs  beyond  firms  control












I- ._Perceptions of Constraints
In this section we examine qualitative data on constraints to investment.  Rankings of
constraints can give us a general idea of the factors that are likely to affect both the marginal
return to  investment and the discount rate.  In the  1998 survey, Ugandan  firms identified
price  and  quality  of  utility  services (electricity, telephones,  water,  etc.),  high  taxes  and
interest rates as "major" constraints to investment (Figure 4).
Figure  4: Ranking  of Constraints  to Investment  in 1998
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Corruption, access to finance, tax administration, and the cost of raw materials formed
a second tier of leading constraints. lFinally,  the group of "moderate" constraints included the
problems of local competition, lack of demand, lack of business support services, crime and
security,  lack  of  skilled  labor,  and  uncertainty  about  government policies.  The  largest
varianlce in responses between firms were in access to finance and access to raw materials.
19A  similar  survey  carried  out  in  1994 provides  an  interesting dynamic  comparison
(Figure 5).16  In the earlier survey, only high taxes were  ranked a "major" constraint, while
cost and access to finance and infrastructure formed a second tier of "moderate" constraints
together  with  availability  of  inputs,  lack  of  demand,  and  economic policy  uncertainty.
Infrastructure in that survey included both the quality and the price of utility services.
Figure 5:  Ranking  of Constraints  to Future  Operations  and Growth  in 1994
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The  major  differences  between  1994  and  1998,  besides  a  general  elevation  of
constraints in their perceived severity, are (1) the top rating of utility prices when offered in
the  1998 survey  as a  separate constraint choice,  (2) the identification  of corruption  as a
leading constraint when offered in the 1998 survey, (3) the recognition of labor force skills as
a  moderate constraint,  and  (4) the  new evaluation of  the lack  of business  services  as  a
moderate constraint.
A closer look at the constraints by firm category shows that there is little difference
between the relative rankings  in  1998 by  small and large firms (Figure 6).  However,  for
large firms constraints were generally more binding, as reflected in higher perception scores.
For  foreign  firms  (and  construction  industry),  corruption  was  the  second  constraint  in
severity.  For Kampala-based firms, access to utility services was less binding than for other
locations, while  commercial farms and construction companies were  less concerned  with
high taxes than the other firms.
16 The 1994 survey differed slightly in its formulation of constraints, offered fewer choices of constraints to
rank, and included firms from more subsectors of the economy.
20Figure  6: Leading  Constraints  to Investment  by Category  of Firms in 1998
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21Competition
When asked whether competition for their principal product had changed during the
past three years,  88 percent of firms said it had increased,  10 percent reported unchanged
competition, while only 2 percent said it had decreased.  Similarly, the number of new firms
exceeded  those  that  had  exited.  The  firm-level  evidence  of  increased  competition  is
consistent with the liberalization of the economy, and continued start-up of new firms.
Another  feature of competition is its fairness.  In  1994, there was a perception of
unfairness in tax and regulatory administration.  In 1998 this perception remains, with tax
evasion as a leading constraint from unfair competition.  Firms in  commercial agriculture
reported  the  lowest  incidence of  unfair competition.  However, the numerical  constraint
scores  for  competitors  evading  taxes,  undercutting  fair  prices,  or  smuggling  have  all
declined.  Hence, while the overall level of competition has increased, firms'  perception is
that it has become slightly fairer since 1994.
Lower profits  are thus consistent with the observation of increased competition and
the pressure it places on firmns  to reduce costs.  Many of the constraints reported by  firms,
such  as utility prices, cost  of imported  inputs, and  interest rates,  are cost  items that  are
outside their direct control.  Hence, one can infer from the perception data that increased
competition may not have been matched with corresponding improvements in physical and
other  support  systems, particularly  those  that  are in  the public  domain.  This  makes  it
difficult for firms to respond to  the challenge of increased competition  brought  about by
external liberalization by cutting costs.
Costs Beyond Firms'  Control
The Ugandan firm survey points at least to three categories of costs which are beyond
the firm's  control but nonetheless tend to lower their profits.  First, capital goods, which are
typically imported items, are more expensive in Africa than elsewhere.  The Ugandan survey
found that transport and other import-related costs add about 50 percent, on average, to the
cost of imported inputs compared to their cost in the country which produced them (typically
Europe). While for the African comparator countries similar data are not available, it is likely
that Uganda is more disadvantaged, given that it is a land-locked country.
Second, infrastructure services are highly deficient and costly in Africa, which  also
affects profits (and tends to shift the MR curve to the left).  The 1998 survey confirmed that
the cost  of utilities  is the most  binding constraint to  all types  of  firms.  Reliability  and
adequacy of electric power supply remain the leading infrastructure constraints to Ugandan
enterprises, the only "major" constraints in the evaluation of respondents.  Responses suggest
that the electric power  supply has in  fact worsened in the last few years  as demand has
increased.  Given  the  poor  quality  of  infrastructure  services, investment  in  productive
capacity often requires an additional investment in complementary capital by the firm.  A
case in point is the need to purchase electric power generators.'7 As many as 77 percent of
large firms, 44 of medium-sized firms and 16 percent of small firms own power generators.
Over half of the firms  in tourism and agro-processing have invested in  their own power
generating capacity.  Although a very rough estimate, the survey indicates that the firms in
17  See Reinikka and Svensson (1999) for the impact of deficient complementary  capital on  private
investment.
22the five sectors alone have installed a small-scale generating capacity, which is about 60 to
80 percent of Uganda's total hydro power.
Despite rapid economic growth, large-scale hydro power generation has not increased
at all since the late 1  980s.  This is reflected both in a perceived deterioration of service from
the public sector and increased private investment in subsistence power generation by firms.
The data show that the number and size of generators bought by firns  increased considerably
in  1995-97,  compared  to  the  early  1990s.  In  terms  of  cost,  investment  in  generators
represents 16 percent of the value of total investment in  1997 and firmns  report that they are
about three times as costly to run as power from the public grid.
Third, corruption  is  another factor that  adversely affects returns  to  investment  and
hence shifts the MR curve inwards.  While cross-country comparisons are not available, the
Ugandan survey data show that the larger, more profitable, more export-oriented the firm, the
higher the incidence and the amount of bribe payment (Svensson 1999).  As can be expected,
firms in the formal sector are more likely to have to pay bribes, for example, to tax collectors
or  for utility  services.  For the  firms that reported positive  bribe payments,  the  average
amount  of  informal  payment  was US$8,300  per  year  (median  value  US$1,800),  which
corresponds to US$88 per worker, or roughly 3 percent of their gross sales. For comparison,
the cost of fuel constituted, on average, 4.6 percent of gross sales, and interest payments to
gross sales for the average firm in 1997 were 3.9 percent.  Clearly, bribes are significant.
Risks
Factors that affect the discount rate 0 and hence shift the horizontal line in Figures 2-3
include risk.  The Ugandan  survey reveals at least three types of risks that can adversely
affect fimns' expectations of future returns.  It is important to note, however, that we do not
have comparative data on risk from other African countries.  Presumably, some of these risks
are fairly similar across most African economies. Similarly, the distinction between risks and
costs is not clear-cut so that the diagnosis here is only indicative at best.
First, erratic infrastructure services create a high risk in terms of unexpected delays
(and related extra costs) in production, imports and exports.  For example, it takes 30 days,
on average, for imported inputs to arrive from their original destination in the port (typically
Mombasa), another 30 days from the port to the Ugandan customs and, finally, an extra nine
days to the firm.  While these figures are ex post  averages, there is considerable variance
among firms.  In electric power supply, firms report that a total of 87 operating days are lost
in a year due to power cuts.  While variance between firms is smaller with respect to power
shortages than other infrastructure services, it creates uncertainty, particularly regarding its
future improvements (Reinikka and Svensson 1999).
Second, while tax policy and administration have improved a great deal during the past
decade, the system is still adversely affected by lack of trust. This manifests itself in poor
compliance on the one hand and arbitrary procedures in granting tax exemptions and carrying
out tax assessments and audits on the other.  In the 1998 survey, for example, manufacturing
firms reported that one half of their competitors gain an advantage through tax evasion.  In
construction  and  agro-processing,  the  reported  share  was  about  40  percent,  while  in
commercial agriculture, where the share of tax paying firmns  is the lowest, only 5 percent of
competitors were perceived to evade taxes.  In response, tax audits and assessments by the
tax collector are frequent.  However, predetermined criteria do not  exist for conducting  an
23audit, although factors such as the compliance record, quality of returns, and the size of the
firm seem to be important.
Sixty-eight percent of all Ugandan firms were audited either for corporate income tax,
VAT, or both during the past three years.  As many as 51 percent of firns  had a disagreement
with the revenue authority on their tax assessment, carried out by the latter.  Similarly, the
VAT refunds  may be  denied  (18 percent  of  firms did  not receive  any  refund, while  40
percent received less than they claimed ).  Or they may take a long time to arrive (over half
of the firms waited for more than six weeks, while  10 percent waited  for more than six
months).  These features of the tax administration create uncertainty about the firm's  tax
liability."  Similarly, unreliable VAT (and duty drawback) refunds can make future after-tax
returns less certain and hence increase the firrns discount rate.
Third, crime poses another risk for Ugandan firms.  As to the incidence of crime and
the financial loss due to  crime, the  survey shows that 54 percent  of the  firms had  been
victims of merchandise robbery or theft of goods and equipment over the past three years.
Thirty-seven percent  of the firms had also been victims of fraud.  The loss from all these
incidences was US$7,500 at the median firm during 1995-97.  Compared to corruption the
incidence of crime seems to be relatively random, however.  There is no evidence that the
incidence of robbery or fraud, or the size of the loss from them, are correlated with profit,
sales or other cost and revenue related data from the firms. Nor is there evidence that certain
sectors,  or foreign owned firms, or firms engaged in  trade, are more often the subject  of
crime.  The only characteristic of firms that seems to matter is size (proxied by employment)
and location. Larger firms are more often exposed to crime, and being in Kampala implies a
roughly 20 percent increase in the probability of robbery or theft, independent of the size of
the firm. The probability that the average [median] firm in the sample, which is located in
Kampala and has 120 (35) employers, had suffered from robbery and/or theft during the past
three years is around 70 [63] percent.
Not surprisingly, larger firms and firms located in Kampala spend significantly more in
security. The annual cost of security for the median firm is US$1,800 (which is equal to what
the median firn  reports as corruption payments per year).  The data reveals that a one percent
increase in employment (size) is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in security spending.
Finally,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  non-commercial risks  (captured  by  'political
instability' in the overall ra-nking  of constraints) do not seem to concem many firms that are
already in  operation.  According to  a regional  foreign investor survey in  1994, however,
these risks were more of a concern for potential investors (The World Bank 1  994b).
Policy Credibility and Investor Confidence
The firm survey reveals that the private sector in Uganda was fairly confident in the
early part of 1998 that good macroeconomic management will continue both in the short and
medium term, that is, one and three years from the time of the interview.  This optimism was
spread across all five sectors.  At the time when the survey was carried out (February-July
1998), the inter-bank exchange rate averaged about U Sh 1190 per US dollar. Firms expected
the exchange rate to be about U Sh 1200, on average, a year later, while foreign-owned firms
1  See Chen and Reinikka (1999) for details on Ugandan business taxation.
24anticipated a slightly higher depreciation.19 In the medium tenn  a small depreciation was
expected (less than 10 percent).  These results indicate that firms did not expect any major
exchange rate volatility either in the short or medium term.
Inflation forecasts were also relatively favorable.  Over half of the firms expected that
the country's  single-digit average annual inflation-which  has been maintained consistently
since 1993-will  continue both in the short and medium term.
Two-thirds of the enterprises expected the trade regime to be  further liberalized, and
almost  all  firms  expected  the privatization  program to  continue.  In  fact,  privatization
appeared at the time of the survey to be the most credible of all the government's  economic
policies.  While a large number of productive enterprises have been privatized over the past
several years, privatization of a few high-profile enterprises subsequently failed and  have
been  investigated  for  corruption.  As  a  result,  the  privatization  program  was  partially
suspended in 1998-99.
Firms  were  less  optimistic  about financial  sector reform  and  its  impact  on  future
interest  rates.  About half of the respondents  expected interest  rates to  be  lower in  three
years'  time.  However, close to 40 percent of firms did not believe that the banking sector
can be  reformed  in  the  medium  term  and  expect  even higher  interest  rates  than  now.
Concerning  access to  bank  financing,  four  out  of  every  five  respondents  expected  the
situation to remain the same or improve.  In  1999 the Ugandan financial sector has seen a
number of bank closures  so firms might have been even more pessimistic,  had the survey
been carried out a year later.  While this may be a temporary set back and a sign of more
effective banking supervision, it is likely to have a negative effect on investor confidence, at
least in the short term.
Firms  seemed to  believe in  continued  growth in  1998:  over  two-thirds  of  firms
anticipated  that  their  production  would  increase  over  the  next  three  years.  However,
regarding expected future tax rates, they showed some pessimism:  over half anticipated that
tax rates would be increased; only 25 percent believed that rates would decrease.  In the last
two  government budgets,  that is,  after the survey was implemented, tax  rates have  been
reduced slightly.
W.hile  comparable information is not available for the four other African countries, it is
conceivable that  investor  confidence, as demonstrated by  generally  positive  expectations
about the future, reduce the discount rate of Ugandan firms compared to their counterparts in
many other African countries.  As a result, investment rates are close to the African average,
despite lower profitability.
VVhile  economic performance continues to be strong in Uganda, a deterioration in the
regional security situation in 1998-99, problems of corruption in the privatization program,
and weaknesses in the banking sector might be reflected in less optimistic expectations if the
survey was carried out in 1999.  In our conceptual framework, this would imply an upward
shift in the discount rate (0) and consequently a reduced investment level  (i).  In order to
maintain  the  current  investment  level  or  increase  it  in  the  face  of  more  pessimistic
expectations,  addressing  the  cost  and  risk  factors identified  above becomes  even  more
20 pressing.
19  The short-term outcome was somewhat higher, i.e., around U Sh 1350 including a speculative peak in May
1999.
20  When asked an open-ended question about the best investment opportunity in the Ugandan economy in the
25V. Conclusions
Despite an improved policy  environment, investment rates in Uganda  are relatively
similar to those  elsewhere in Africa.  On average, the investment rate is  slightly over  10
percent,  while at the median  firm, it is  below  1 percent.  Such low investment  rates in
response to economic reform pose a serious policy problem. Unlike in many other African
comparator countries, in  Uganda (and  Ghana) a majority of firms  experienced a positive
change in the in value-added and gross sales.  Investment by small firms seemed to be partly
constrained by  liquidity, while large firms, on average, could choose to invest more from
internal  funds.  Ugandan  profits  are  found  to  be  considerably  lower  than  profit  rates
elsewhere in Africa.
These results  are consistent with  the view that  during the  sample period,  Ugandan
firms  displayed more  confidence  in  the economy  than their  counterparts  in  many  other
African countries. Thus, for a given profit rate Ugandan firms invest more. At the same time
increased competition, due to far-reaching economic liberalization, has put pressure on firms
to cut costs.  Many of the costs, such as utility prices, transport costs, and interest rates, are
not in the firms'  control, however.  As there has been no matching improvement in these
sectors in Uganda, firms have not been able to meet the challenge of increased competition
by reducing costs. Thus, profits have been squeezed.
From the survey, we were able to identify a number of cost factors that can explain the
observed lower level of investment in Africa in general and the lower profits in Uganda in
particular.  First, capital goods are more expensive, largely due to higher transport costs, and
inefficiencies in  transit  transport  and ports.  Second, apart  from  investing  in  productive
assets, firms often need to purchase complementary capital, such as power  generators, in
order to stay in operation. Third, corruption is a problem for most firms but particularly  for
those that invest more, and are larger in terms of employment, active in the formal sector,
and trade-oriented.
We identified several risk factors that are likely to increase the discount factor firms
apply  to  the  future  cash  flow  from  investment  and  make  longer  term  investment  less
attractive.  These  include  risks  posed  by  erratic  infrastructure  services,  arbitrary  tax
administration, and crime.  At the same time, macroeconomic policy credibility and investor
confidence have improved considerably in Uganda. The risk of economic policy reversal is
perceived to be relatively minor.  This reduces the discount rate of firms.
For policy the Ugandan survey findings suggest four key priorities.  First, the electric
power sector urgently needs an effective reform program, combined with new investment in
large-scale hydro-power capacity. This is key to the firm sector growth.  Without a major
improvement  in power  supply, sustainability of current growth rates is  uncertain.  Other
utilities also need to  improve their service  delivery.  Second, while the government  has
committed in its 1998/99 and 1999/00 budgets not to raise tax rates, tax administration needs
improvement.  One way  could be  to initiate  a  trust building  effort through  setting  up  a
medium  term (that is, in the next three years),  frmis listed a large variety  of econornic  activities. Agriculture
(horticulture,  fruit, flower,  fishing, cattle,  etc.) and agro-processing  were the most popular choices. Tourism
and manufacturing  the latter  mainly  for the local market,  were also frequently  mentioned  opportunities.  A few
firms considered  trading  as the most profitable  activity  but the share of these  firms  was small  in the total survey
sample.
26systematic mechanism of consultation between the tax collector and taxpayers  as well as
proper appeals procedures.
Third, a concerted effort to reduce corruption and  improve contract enforcement  is
required.  Such efforts are likely to take time, and it is important in the beginning to choose
measures that have a strong signaling effect.  A recent household survey found that judiciary
and police  are one of the most corrupt institutions (Republic of Uganda  1998).  Tackling
corruption in these institutions should  lead to less crime and as well as a reduction in the cost
of security, both of which  are now a serious problem for firms.  Finally, there is a need to
open  a  more  efficient  transport  route  to  the  coast,  both  in  terms  of  improving  the
infrastructure and reducing red tape.  The international donor community active in Uganda
could play a role, as it is likely to be difficult for Uganda alone to bring about major changes
in transit transport when part of the problem is in the neighboring countries.
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28Annex
Table  Al:  Distribution  of Establishments  and  Employment
Within  the Five Selected  Industrial  Sectors
Small  Medium  Large  Very Large  Total
(5  - 20)  (21-  100)  (101-  500)  (>  500)
Share  Share  Share  Share  Share
No.  (percent)  No.  (percent)  No.  (percent)  No.  (percent)  No.  (percent,)
Commercial  agriculture
Establishments  39  61  13  20  7  11  5  8  64  100
Employment  457  3  385  3  1,385  10  11,326  84  13,553  100
Agro-processing
Establishments  265  66  113  28  20  5  5  1  403  100
Employment  2,358  16  4,933  33  3,346  22  4,332  29  14,969  100
Other manufacturing
Establishments  493  74  145  22  29  4  2  0  669  100
Employment  4,227  25  6,121  37  5,181  31  1,053  6  16,582  100
Construction
Establishments  32  60  13  25  6  11  2  4  53  100
Employment  339  6  601  10  1,397  23  3,818  62  6,155  100
Tourism
Establishments  82  88  10  11  1  1  0  0  93  100
Employment  739  58  417  33  120  9  0  0  1,276  100
Total
Establishments  911  71  294  23  63  5  14  1  1,282  100
Employment  8,120  15  12,457  24  11,429  22  20,529  39  52,535  100
Source: 1996  Updated  Industrial  Census,  Department  of Statistics,  Entebbe.
29Table  A2: Characteristics  of the Firms in the Sample
Enterprises  Employment
Share  Share
Number  (percent)  Number  (percent)
By  firm size
Small  (5-20)  93  38.3  990  3.3
Medium  (21-100)  86  35.4  4,293  14.3
Large  (> 100)  64  26.3  24,788  82.4
Total  243  100.0  30,071  100.0
By  sector
Commercial  agriculture  28  11.5  2,137  7.1
Agro-processing  58  23.9  12,792  42.5
Other  manufacturing  102  42.0  7,748  25.8
Construction  26  10.7  6,240  20.8
Tourism  29  11.9  1,154  3.8
Total  243  100.0  30,071  100.0
By location
Kampala  130  53.5  18,602  61.9
Jinja-Iganga  45  18.5  3,806  12.7
Mbale-Tororo  19  7.8  2,382  7.9
Mukono  24  9.9  3,801  12.6
Mbarara  25  10.3  1,480  4.9
Total  243  100.0  30,071  100.0
By ownership
Ugandan  170  70.0  9,477  31.5
Foreign  39  16.0  11,700  38.9
Joint  34  14.0  8,894  29.6
Total  243  100.0  30,071  100.0
Source: 1998  Firm  Survey.
30Table  A3: Distribution  of Establishments  and Employment
of the Firms  Included  in the Survey  Sample
Small  Medium  Large  Total
(5 - 20)  (21-  100)  (> 100)
No.  Share  No.  Share  No.  Share  No.  Share
(percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
Commercial  agriculture
Establishments  13  46  10  36  5  18  28  100
Employment  122  6  554  26  1,461  68  2,137  100
Agro-processing
Establishments  18  31  18  31  22  38  58  100
Employment  214  2  911  7  11,667  91  12,792  100
Other  manufacturing
Establishments  42  41  38  37  22  22  102  100
Employment  453  6  1,760  23  5,535  71  7,748  100
Construction
Establishments  3  12  12  46  11  42  26  100
Employment  22  0  641  10  5,577  89  6,240  100
Tourism
Establishments  17  59  8  28  4  14  29  100
Employment  179  16  427  37  548  47  1,154  100
Total
Establishments  93  38  86  35  64  26  243  100
Employment  990  3  4,293  14  24,788  82  30,071  100
Source:  1998  Firm  Survey.
31A4. Derivation of the Investment Equation
Let  the  cost  of  instantaneous  net  investment  be  given  by  C(I),  where  I  is  net
investment and C is a cost function with  C(O)  = O, and C', C" > 0  for all I > 0. Let profit be a
concave function of the capital stock II = rI (t, K) and assume that the firm takes product and
factor prices as given. As shown by Tybout (1983), with constant relative prices, investment
can be written as
I(t)  = A[K  - K(t)]  (Al)
whereK* is  the desired  capital  stock  implicitly  determined byri I(K') = rC'O,  and  ,B is  a
composite variable (constant) of the discount rate, r,  and  II" and  C" evaluated at  K' and 0
respectively.  Hence,  in  the  flexible accelerator model,  investment  is  driven  by  the  gap
between the desired and actual capital stock, where the relative sluggishness of adjustment
depends on the user cost of capital. Assume that managers expect that the future demand for
their output will be Q,  and let K* (t) =  Q*  (t),  where 7 is determined by relative prices. In
discrete time, equation (1) can be written as
I(t)  = 8[2Q*  (t) - K(t - 1)]  (A2)
We assume that demand expectations are linear functions of current output. Thus,
I(t)  = 3[y70qQ(t)  - K(t - 1)]  (A3)
By  first-differencing  equation  (A.3)  and  noting  that I(t -1)  = K(t -1) - K(t - 2),
equation (A3) can be written as
I(t)  = ao  AQ(t) + (1-  )  I (t - 1)  (A4)
where  aQ  - and A  Q(t) = Q(t) - Q(t - 1)  . This is the traditional flexible accelerator model in
which fluctuations in sales motivate changes in capital spending, i.e., investment is driven by
demand.
As  shown in Tybout (1983), if firms must finance all investment out  of profits  and
retained earnings, the firms will behave according to  (4) when they have funds to do  so.
However,  with  currently  binding  shortages,  they  will  simply  allocate  current  profits  to
investment. Hence,
I(t) = C-'[Il(t)]  (A5)
We can now form a general empirical model by nesting (A4) and (A5),
I (t) = acoaQAQi  (t) + arni  (t) + a,  (t - 1)  + a.X,  +d, +  (A6)
32where cxio  is a constant for firm i, a_,  is a nx 1 vector of coefficients, Xi is a nx 1 vector of firm
specific controls (firm age and size), d, is a time dummy and Fs  is an iid error term. To avoid
heteroskedasticity problem with respect to size, I(t), AQ#(t)  and HII(t)  are scaled by the inverse
of the end of the previous period capital stock, K(t-l).  Thus, we are regressing investment
rate,  I(t)/K 1(t-l),  on  change in  output  (value added) rate, AQ1(t)/K 1(t-l)  and profit  rate,
Ilj(t)/Kj(t-l).
We  estimate  a  number  of  variations  of  (A6): with  fixed  effects  (a 1o)  and  with  a
common constant (ao); and with and without the lagged investment variable. Given the short
panel, there are clear costs of estimating the more complex regressions. With fixed effects we
lose'all firms who do not have observations for all three years. 21 Similarly, including a lagged
dependent variable implies that we lose observations for firns  that started up after 1995, and
fixed effects in  a  dynamic  model with  short  time  dimension results  in  biased  estimates
[Nickell (1981)] that  cannot be  overcome by instrument variables  techniques  (due  to the
short panel) as suggested by Arellano & Bond (1991).
21 Note that two create a panel with at the most two observations  for each firm we must use data for three
years since AQ(t)=Q(t)-Q(t-1).
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